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Neoliberalism: A Left-Wing Straw Man?
Most of the contributions to the excellent collection of essays central to this
symposium, refer to neoliberalism, in some cases quite frequently. None of them
defines the concept, nor does any of them defend neoliberalism. The term is used
mostly in a (very) critical sense, sometimes even dismissively. This book is far
from unique in this respect. Indeed, the term neoliberalism is almost never used by
politicians or scholars in order to vindicate a political ideal. Instead, during the past
decade it has become a standard feature of left-wing political discourse, not only in
academia and political activism, but also in mainstream left-wing politics. It is a term
used by us to refer to them and their abominable politics.
This does not necessarily mean that neoliberalism is a strawman. It might still
refer to something in reality. Rather than as a political ideal, say, of rediscovered
liberty, the term neoliberalism might make some sense perhaps as a reference
to a distinct set of economic measures and policies. In alphabetic order, some of
the relevant keywords could include: austerity, deregulation, efficiency, experts,
globalisation, governance, impact assessments, markets, preferences, privatisation,
regulatory competition, and stakeholders. Each of these terms figures also in the
book, some of them quite prominently. However, it is not easy to discover even a
family resemblance among these concepts, other than that we use them much more
often today than three decades ago. Indeed, exactly because these policies and
discourses are not underpinned by any distinct value or principle the boundaries of
this set of policies are extremely vague. And the label of neoliberalism does not bring
us any further.
So, even if neoliberalism is not a strawman set up by the left, nevertheless it
seems a bit facile to lump together everything we don’t like under one single
label, especially in the context of academic discourse. Indeed, the wisest words
in the book in this regard come from Micklitz, who points out that ‘usually, the
reference to neoliberalism serves as a substitute for a deeper debate on what
exactly neoliberalism might mean.’
The Internal Contradictions of the Neoliberal
Paradigm: Libertarianism vs. Utilitarianism
In sum, the label ‘neoliberalism’ doesn’t explain much. It may be useful in describing
a set of economic policies, akin to those that used to be referred to as the
Washington consensus, at the heart of which is a strong faith in free markets.
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However, it tells us nothing about the reasons, values, or principles that have been
– or might be – offered in support of that economic agenda. It is therefore hardly
surprising that it is difficult to find any self-described neoliberals. No one wishes to
own the title.
In reality, behind the pro-market agendas we can discover at least two very different
political philosophies, which in important respects are each other’s opposite, i.e.
libertarianism and utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than presenting neoliberalism as
the powerful political enemy to be defeated it might be fruitful, in the best tradition
of left-wing critique, to point to the internal contradictions within the very notion of
neoliberalism. For neoliberalism as a political paradigm is incoherent.
The core value of libertarianism is the individual freedom to be left alone (negative
freedom). There exist many different varieties of libertarianism, from Hayekian
to Nozickian and beyond. However, they all have at their core the protection of a
pre-political right to individual freedom, understood as non-interference, by strong
political institutions. By contrast, the utilitarian ideal is to maximise the overall
amount of utility, welfare, or preference satisfaction in a society. Today, welfare
economics, and the normative law & economics grounded in it, are the most visible
heirs to classical utilitarianism, even though certainly not all utilitarians would accept
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a standard for utility. Both libertarians and utilitarians claim
a central role in society for markets, but could they team up to justify together the
range of policies often referred to as neoliberalism? Let’s see.
• Libertarians want to minimise interference; utilitarians aim to maximise utility.
• Libertarianism is individualist (atomism), utilitarianism collectivist (aggregation).
• Libertarianism is backward-looking (entitlements, esp property rights),
utilitarianism, being consequentialist, is forward-looking (social welfare,
sometimes reduced to economic growth).
• For libertarians the law is about objective moral right and wrong and subjective
rights and obligations; for utilitarians the law is an instrument that provides
incentives for maximising the satisfaction of subjective preferences.
• Libertarians advocate free markets as intrinsically just; utilitarians support them
as instrumentally useful.
• Libertarians defend freedom of contract as a natural right; utilitarians support it
because – and to the extent that – it maximises joint surplus.
• Libertarians reject distributive justice as theft; utilitarians are indifferent in
principle, but advise to use tax and transfer, not private law, as the way to do it.
• Libertarians demand unanimous political consent; utilitarians follow expert
advice on efficiency (impact assessments).
• Libertarians believe that only the market knows (competition as discovery
procedure); utilitarians believe in counting revealed preferences.
• Libertarians regard liberty as an innate natural right, normatively prior to all laws
and policy consideration; utilitarians consider rights talk nonsense upon stilts
(Bentham) and past entitlements water under the bridge, to be respected only if,
as a rule, this will make us as a society better off in the future.
Hayek is often considered the arch neoliberal. This is what he had to say on welfare
economics:
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‘The childish attempts to provide a basis for “just” action by measuring
the relative utilities or satisfactions of different persons simply cannot be
taken seriously. … But most economists begin to see that the whole of
the so-called “welfare economics”, which pretends to base its argument
on inter-personal comparisons of ascertainable utilities, lacks all scientific
foundation. The idea of basing coercive actions by government on such
fantasies is clearly an absurdity.’ (Law, legislation and liberty (1979), Vol III,
201-202).
Hayek’s own concern was strictly with the constitution of liberty. Individual liberty,
spontaneous order, and the incurable ignorance of government and regulators are
libertarian concerns. Foucault reserved the term ‘neoliberal’ strictly for various forms
of what I have been calling libertarianism (Naissance de la biopolitique (1978-1979),
80). And this makes sense.
The problem, however, is that neoliberalism in this narrow, more meaningful sense
cannot explain many of the policies that are usually denounced as neoliberal. On
this view, efficiency thinking, cost-benefit analysis, impact assessments, regulatory
competition, and ‘justice for growth’ are not neoliberal policies at all. Indeed, they all
are policies and instruments characteristic of welfarist consequentialism.
For neoliberals in a narrow sense, free markets based on individual liberty,
understood as freedom as non-interference (negative liberty), are the aim, not a
means to any ulterior aim. By contrast, at least since the Lisbon agenda, the internal
market has been understood by various EU institutions on various occasions as a
means to the end of economic growth, a collectivist aim that may well clash in many
respects with negative liberty.
European Private Law was Never Neoliberal
These internal tensions within the neoliberal paradigm do not occur merely at a
theoretical level. They are also directly relevant for law making. When applied to
European private law, for example, the neoliberal paradigm immediately falls apart.
Take the case of unfair terms control, the centre-piece of the European private law
acquis. Libertarians categorically reject unfair terms control as intrinsically wrong.
They consider it an impermissible interference with the natural right to formal (i.e.
non-‘materialised’) freedom of contract, that it is the state’s task to protect rather than
to undermine. It also leads, in their view, to an illegitimate redistribution of legitimate
earnings from those with better bargaining skills towards weaker parties in contracts.
Indeed, the original Commission proposal for the directive had come under severe
libertarian attack, e.g. from Brandner & Ulmer who accused the Commission of
wanting to introduce ‘the socialist law of contract’.
Welfarist utilitarians, by contrast, could justify unfair terms control, in principle, for
instrumental reasons. If a plausible case could be made that the market for standard
terms is a lemon market, then they could defend the control of their content as an
adequate response to market failure. However, welfarists would have a hard time
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justifying some core elements in the regime specifically adopted by the EU. Why limit
protection to consumers? Worse, why focus on unfairness rather than inefficiency?
And what about the exemplary role (Leitbildfunktion) that the CJEU attributes to
default rules? In the CJEU’s reading, default rules express the legislature’s view
of a fair balance between the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract
(see most recently Banca Transilvania, para 26). And it is this fair balance that
serves as a benchmark for determining whether a contract term causes a ‘significant
imbalance’ in the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract, and must
therefore be considered unfair in the sense of Art. 3 Unfair Terms Directive 1993.
By contrast, on a welfarist utilitarian reading, the purpose of non-mandatory rules
of contract law is to assist contracting parties in saving transaction costs. In order
to achieve this result, default rules should mimic what typical parties would agree
to in the absence of transaction costs – but crucially not in the absence of unequal
bargaining.
In sum, neither libertarian neoliberalism nor utilitarianism welfarism can explain the
unfairness control and the Leitbildfunktion that are at the heart of the EU approach
to standard terms in contracts (boiler plate), which in turn, as said, is a centre-piece
of the acquis. Only a thoroughly ‘materialised’ (i.e. substantive) understanding of
freedom and equality can, which in its turn is at the heart of liberal-egalitarianism.
In other words, if we wanted to attach a reductionist label to this key element of the
European private law acquis then probably the most plausible one would be liberal-
egalitarianism, as political philosophers call it, or social democracy, as we used to
say in European politics.
Very much the same applies to other core elements of the acquis. Take the
withdrawal rights in consumer contracts. These directly undermine the sanctity of
contract, which makes them unacceptable for libertarians, especially for transfer
theorists who believe that contractual consent already transfers a property-like
entitlement. Utilitarians would be able to make some sense of withdrawal rights,
if only consumers could opt-out of them ex ante, e.g. when they prefer a lower
price over an insurance against disappointment – except of course that pursuant
to the Consumer Rights Directive 2011, consumers cannot waive their withdrawal
rights ex ante. And to give one more example, outside consumer law this time,
the 2019 directive on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships
in the agricultural and food supply chain would leave libertarians and welfarist
utilitarians equally worried about the future of freedom of contract in the internal
market. At the same time, however, the directive makes perfect sense from the
perspectives of various other political philosophies, including the liberal-egalitarian
(substantive equality), communitarian (solidarity) and civic republican (freedom as
non-domination) concerns with the protection of weaker parties.
In sum, libertarians would reject the private law acquis lock stock and barrel, while
welfarist utilitarians could support at most selected elements of it. At the same time,
liberal-egalitarians, communitarians and civic republicans might support a great deal
of it. In other words, it would make sense for various branches of the European left to
vindicate much of the private law acquis rather than to reject it as neoliberal.
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Domination by Paradigm: Background
Understandings in a Pluralist Society
Taking one step back, the question arises whether it makes any sense at all to
formulate one single background understanding as paradigmatic for an era, as
seems to be the assumption underlying in the theme of our symposium, i.e. ‘What
Comes after Neoliberalism?’.
There is a venerable tradition, going back to Hegel’s Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and
in more recent times Taylor’s social imaginaries, of formulating a background
understanding for a society in a certain time and place. Specifically for private
law, the idea of latent background knowledge has been applied, diachronically,
by Habermas (paradigms of law: liberal, social welfare, procedural) and Kennedy
(globalisations of legal thought: classical legal thought, the social, and policy
analysis/balancing), trying to catch the spirit of an age in one single legal paradigm.
In this book, Bartl similarly presents the transformations of private law in Europe over
the past two centuries as successive responses to what she calls socio-economic
imaginaries.
However, in pluralist societies like our own, it seems highly problematic, both
descriptively and normatively, to reduce the points of view of so many different
persons to one single background understanding. Legal paradigms are essentially
monistic, at least internally, and hegemonistic, at least in their aspiration. The
question arises whether in a pluralist society democratic deliberation, that should
involve the views of all citizens, including those at the periphery, ever could yield
such a monolithic picture of – in this case – private law. If not, this would seem to
suggest that such a paradigm could only be (super)imposed on them, be it merely in
a descriptive manner or also normatively. In either case, it seems, this would amount
to an act of oppression. And this would be no less the case – quite the contrary – if
the background understanding was said to represent the ‘dominant’ view.
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